A Chapter of Answers
The twenty-third chapter of Calvin's third Book is a chapter of answers. In III.21 and III.22 he set out election and reprobation; here he takes up the objections, which he calls calumnies, and meets them one by one in fourteen sections. No chapter shows Calvin more willing to say what his doctrine costs. It holds the sentence that gives this Book of ours its name. We have taken his words for our title because we cannot improve on them. He looked at the decree, called it dreadful, and did not look away.
He opens with those who would keep election and drop reprobation. They hope to defend God from an odious charge, and Calvin will not accept their help. He calls their position ignorant and childish, "since election itself would not stand unless it were set over against reprobation" (III.23.1). "Those, therefore, whom God passes over he reprobates, and for no other cause than that he wills to exclude them from the inheritance which he predestines for his children" (III.23.1).
His proofs are two. The first is the saying that every plant the heavenly Father has not planted will be rooted up, from which Calvin concludes that "all whom the heavenly Father has not deigned to plant as sacred trees in his field are consigned and devoted to destruction" (III.23.1). The second is Paul's passage on the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction. The first is from Matthew, which is not our Gospel. The second is from the ninth chapter of Romans, of which our Romans keeps only the first three verses. We do not rest our case on that, but the reader should know that the two pillars of this section do not stand in the scripture we read.
Calvin then closes the door that softer theologians leave ajar. They say God tolerates the vessels of wrath and waits to see whether they will repent. Calvin answers with Augustine that God turns wolves into sheep by the power of his grace, and that "he therefore does not convert the obstinate because he does not put forth that more powerful grace, which he would not lack if he willed to bring it forth" (III.23.1).
Here Calvin argues well, and we say so without reserve. If there is one God, who made every human being, who holds a grace able to turn any wolf into a sheep, and who uses it on some, then the rest are passed by because he chose to pass them by. Our quarrel is not with his logic. It is with the premise that there is only one God, to whom both the mercy and the hardening belong.
Because He Willed It
The first objection is the oldest. Why should God be offended with creatures who have not yet offended him? Calvin states it in words no opponent could sharpen: "to devote to destruction whomever he pleases suits the caprice of a tyrant more than the lawful sentence of a judge" (III.23.2). He introduces the objectors as dogs, and later in the chapter he will call others swine. We note the language and will not answer in kind.
His answer is the will of God, which may not be questioned because it is the cause of all that exists. "So completely is the will of God the supreme rule of righteousness", Calvin writes, "that whatever he wills must be held righteous for the very reason that he wills it" (III.23.2). And then the sentence that ends every inquiry: "When, therefore, it is asked why the Lord did so, the answer must be: Because he willed it" (III.23.2). To go further is to look for something above God, and nothing can be found there (III.23.2). Tholuck's edition of the Latin notes that the thought is taken from Augustine's first book on Genesis against the Manichees.
Calvin knows how this sounds, and he guards it. He rejects the fiction of an absolute power as profane; God is not lawless but a law to himself. "But we deny that he is liable to render an account" (III.23.2). In III.23.3 he adds that God owes man nothing: "Since we are all corrupted by sin, we cannot but be hateful to God, and that not from tyrannical cruelty but by the most equitable reckoning of justice" (III.23.3). The reprobate, he says, plead God as their excuse for a damnation whose cause they are forced to find in themselves, and he answers with an admission most defenders of his doctrine would have softened: "But though I should confess a hundred times that God is the author, which is most true, they do not for all that wash away their guilt" (III.23.3).
We grant the guard. Calvin does not want a tyrant, and he says so. But the guard has no content we can see. If whatever God wills is righteous by the very fact that he wills it, the word righteous no longer tells us anything about what God will do. It would have been righteous for God to save all, and it is righteous for him to doom some before birth. A law to himself, who owes no account, is a law no one else can read.
Our Lord also gave a reason for what the Father does, and the reason was the Father's pleasure. "I thank you and praise you, Lord of heaven, because what was hidden from the wise and educated you have revealed to the simple. Yes, Father, because this was pleasing to you" (Evangelion 6:29 TT). What pleases the Father there is the revealing. The things were hidden from the clever, not from the doomed, and the verse does not say the Father hid them. The same Gospel tells us what the Father's pleasure is for: "Don't be afraid, little flock, because the Father is pleased to give you the kingdom" (Evangelion 8:26 TT). Calvin says that when we ask why, we must answer, because he willed it, and ask no further. The Son lets us ask what the Father wills, and tells us: he is pleased to give.
The Potter and the Deep
The second objection presses further. Were men not predestined to the very corruption for which they are now condemned? Calvin does not deny it. "I readily admit that it was by the will of God that all the sons of Adam fell into this wretched condition in which they are now bound" (III.23.4). We must always return, he says, to the sole decision of God's will, whose cause is hidden in himself (III.23.4).
His answer is the potter. He quotes Paul: "O man, who are you to dispute with God? Does the thing formed say to him who formed it, Why have you made me thus?" (III.23.4). He knows the reply will be called an evasion, an appeal to power that silences the question without answering it, and he denies it: Paul only showed that divine justice is too high for human measure. He adds a verse of Proverbs, read to mean that God punishes fools to whom he did not deign to give his Spirit, and he extends the argument to the angels who fell, who were abandoned (III.23.4).
In III.23.5 he puts names to his opponents. He imagines some Manichee, or some Coelestinus, coming forward as a slanderer of divine providence (Manichaeus aliquis aut Coelestinus); by the second name he seems to mean Coelestius, the companion of Pelagius. His reply is that "I say with Paul that no account of it is to be given, because by its greatness it far surpasses our understanding" (III.23.5). Then he takes Augustine's side outright: "I say with Augustine that the Lord created those whom he foreknew without doubt would go to destruction, and that this was so done because he so willed" (III.23.5). "As to why he willed it, it is not for us to demand the reason, since we cannot comprehend it; nor is it fitting that the divine will should come down among us to be disputed" (III.23.5). He ends with a long passage of Augustine on the height and the depth, whose heart is the line "Faithful ignorance is better than rash knowledge" (III.23.5).
Calvin is right that a creature cannot audit its maker, and that much of God must be beyond us. We do not ask for a God we can comprehend. But look at what the potter is doing in this argument. It is not answering a question about God's goodness. It is forbidding one. The image comes from Israel's prophets, who used it of the Creator and his people, and in our Romans it does not appear. What our Romans has, where Calvin's potter would stand, is Paul's grief over the people whom Calvin's ninth chapter consigns to hardening: "that I have great sorrow and unceasing grief in my heart," (Romans 9:2 TT) "for I could wish to be cut off from Christ for the sake of my brothers, my kinsmen according to the flesh" (Romans 9:3 TT). Calvin's Paul, faced with the lost, tells the questioner to be quiet. Our Paul, faced with the same lost, wishes himself cut off in their place.
Our Romans also has the deep. "Oh, the depth of the riches and of the wisdom of God, and his ways are unfathomable!" (Romans 11:1 TT). We pray those words gladly. But in our text they follow the announcement that Christ is the end of the Law for everyone who believes, and the depth they praise is a depth of riches. Calvin uses the depth to close the mouth of anyone who asks why some were made for destruction. Paul uses it to praise what has been given.
Doomed From the Womb
The next objection, Calvin says, seeks less to accuse God than to excuse the sinner, and he puts it in its strongest form: "Why should God impute to men as a fault those things whose necessity he imposed by his own predestination?" (III.23.6).
At this point Calvin sets aside the defence to which the church's writers usually turned, that nothing in God's foreknowledge keeps him from treating man as a sinner, since the evils God foresees are man's and not his. That would not stop the critic, who would reply that God could have prevented what he foresaw (III.23.6). Calvin takes a harder road. He cites Solomon's saying in Proverbs, that "God made all things for his own sake, even the wicked for the day of evil" (III.23.6), and draws from it the most unsparing sentence in the chapter. Since life and death are in God's hand, "by his counsel and will he so ordains that there are born among men those devoted from the womb to certain death, to glorify his name by their destruction" (III.23.6).
The ancient writers, he says, used the answer from foreknowledge with some hesitation, and the Schoolmen rested in it. Calvin grants that bare foreknowledge lays no necessity on anyone, but he prefers the Italian humanist Lorenzo Valla, whom he thinks no great theologian but sharp on this point, because Valla saw that "both life and death are acts of the divine will rather than of foreknowledge" (III.23.6). Foreknowledge is not the bottom of the matter, for God "foresees what is to come for no other reason than that he decreed that it should so come to pass" (III.23.6).
We admire the courage of this section even as we reject its God. Calvin saw that a God who foresees a ruin he could prevent, and creates the ruined anyway, has chosen the ruin. He said so, and he said what it was for.
That phrase, glorify his name by their destruction, is the clearest line we know between Calvin's God and the Father. Our Paul writes, "For God has not appointed us for wrath, but for the obtaining of rescue through our Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Thessalonians 5:9 TT). He tells the Laodiceans that believers "have been destined and appointed to live for the praise of glory" (Laodiceans 1:6 TT). Our text knows a destiny and a glory, but not a glory paid for with the destruction of people made for that purpose. Our Lord told us what makes heaven glad: "In a similar way, there is more joy in heaven over one sinner who repents than over ninety-nine righteous people who have no need to repent!" (Evangelion 10:3 TT). And he said what he came for: "because the Son of Man came to rescue what was lost" (Evangelion 12:19 TT). Calvin's God is glorified when the lost are destroyed. The Father the Son revealed is glad when they are found.
The Fall Arranged
In III.23.7 Calvin goes back to the beginning. His opponents deny that Scripture ever says in so many words that God decreed Adam's fall. In their account, Calvin reports, "He had free choice, they say, so that he might shape his own fortune, and God determined nothing except to deal with him according to his deserts" (III.23.7). Calvin has no patience with it, and asks, "If so feeble a fiction is accepted, where will that omnipotence of God be" (III.23.7), the omnipotence by which he governs all things according to a secret counsel that depends on nothing else? Whatever they say of Adam, his whole posterity lost salvation by one man's fault, and that, Calvin says, belongs to the counsel of God.
Then Calvin asks the question every reader of this chapter remembers. "Again I ask: how did it come about that the fall of Adam involved so many nations, together with their infant children, in eternal death without remedy, unless because it so seemed good to God?" (III.23.7). He answers it with silence: "Here tongues otherwise so talkative must fall silent" (III.23.7). The next sentence names our Book: "The decree is dreadful, I admit; yet no one will be able to deny that God foreknew what end man would have before he created him, and foreknew it because he had so ordained by his decree" (III.23.7). The Latin is Decretum quidem horribile, fateor, and our title is taken from it. The word horribile means something to shudder at. Calvin is not calling the decree wicked. He is saying that a man who looks at it ought to tremble. But he does not take back a word. "Nor should it seem absurd when I say that God not only foresaw the fall of the first man, and in him the ruin of his posterity, but also ordered it by his own decision" (III.23.7). He closes with Augustine's Enchiridion: God judged it better to bring good out of evil than not to permit evil at all (III.23.7).
We have met this question before, from the other side. Tertullian, in the second book of his work against Marcion, reports Marcion's challenge in nearly these terms: if God is good, and knows the future, and is able to prevent evil, why did he let man be deceived by the devil and fall from obedience into death (Against Marcion II.5)? Tertullian's reply, worked out over several chapters, was man's freedom. God made Adam free, and would not take the freedom back. That is, in substance, the answer Calvin's opponents gave him, and Calvin calls it a feeble fiction.
So the most consistent defender the Creator ever had has granted Marcion's premises. God knew. God could have prevented it. God not only allowed it but arranged it, at his own pleasure, before he made the man. Calvin and Marcion agree on the facts of Eden. They disagree about what to call the one who arranged them. Marcion called him the Creator, and went looking for the Father whom the Son revealed.
We write slowly about the infants, because Calvin's sentence concerns children who died and the parents who buried them, in his century and in ours. He did not write it to wound, and he did not pretend it was easy. But we need not be dumb, because our Lord was not. When his disciples tried to keep the children away, "Jesus called to them and said, “Let the children come to me, because the kingdom of God belongs to those like them.”" (Evangelion 11:31 TT). We will be fair to Paul as well. Our First Corinthians says, "For just as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive:" (1 Corinthians 15:19 TT). Paul knows a death that comes through Adam. But the passage in Romans where all are condemned through one man, which Calvin has in mind when he says that Scripture proclaims it (III.23.7), is not in our Romans, and the verse our Paul does give us puts its weight on the second half.
Permission Is Willing
The next refuge is the distinction between will and permission. Calvin closes this door as he did in his first Book. "But why shall we say that he permits, except because he so wills?" (III.23.8). He will not hesitate to confess with Augustine "that the will of God is the necessity of things, and that whatever he has willed will necessarily come to pass" (III.23.8).
Here he names the parties to the dispute: "either the Pelagians, or the Manichees, or the Anabaptists, or the Epicureans (for it is with these four sects that we have to deal in this argument)" (III.23.8). If they plead the necessity laid on them by predestination, they say nothing to the point. Then he says why the first man fell. "For the first man fell because the Lord had judged it expedient; why he so judged is hidden from us" (III.23.8). "Yet it is certain that he judged so for no other reason than that he saw that the glory of his name would thereby be rightly displayed" (III.23.8). Only after this does he speak of justice: where you hear of God's glory, he says, think of his justice, for what deserves praise must be just (III.23.8).
Having said this, Calvin turns our eyes away from it. God declared all he had made very good, so the depravity came from man. Let us look, he says, at the corruption of our nature, the evident cause that comes closer home, rather than at the hidden and wholly incomprehensible cause in predestination (III.23.8). In III.23.9 he calls the decree consistent with equity, "an equity unknown to us, it is true, but most certain" (III.23.9), and he puts both causes in one sentence: "For although by the eternal providence of God man was created for the calamity to which he is subject, he nevertheless took the material for it from himself, not from God" (III.23.9).
We granted in our fifth chapter that Calvin is right about permission, and we grant it again.
We also stand clear of the excuse Calvin is answering. He lists the Manichees among those who plead necessity to excuse sin. We are not Manichees, and we do not plead necessity. The sinner is responsible for his sin, and Calvin is right to say so. Our complaint is not made on behalf of the sinner. It is made on behalf of the Father, whose name Calvin gives to the God who arranged the fall.
And on that point Calvin's two causes do not sit together. He asks us to look at the near cause and not the far one. But he has already shown us the far one in his own words: man was created for the calamity to which he is subject, and he fell because the Lord judged it expedient, and the Lord so judged because he saw that the glory of his name would be displayed. A judge who arranges the crime for the sake of his glory, and then punishes the criminal, is not made fairer by our looking away from the arrangement. The God who says in Isaiah that he makes peace and creates calamity, a verse Calvin claimed in his first Book (I.17.8, I.18.3), has described himself well enough. Paul has a name for him: "The god of this aeon has blinded the minds of the untrusting" (2 Corinthians 4:1 TT).
Mercy for Some, Judgment for the Rest
The third objection is that election makes God a respecter of persons, which Scripture denies. Calvin's answer is one of the best things in the chapter. In Scripture a person does not mean a human being but the outward things that win or lose favor among men: wealth, power, rank, country, beauty, or their opposites (III.23.10). God is no respecter of persons because he does not prefer the rich to the poor or the Jew to the Greek. One of Calvin's texts stands in our Galatians: "There is no Jew or Greek, no slave or free, no male or female, for all of you are one in Christ Jesus" (Galatians 3:14 TT). Another stands in our First Corinthians: "Look at your calling, brothers and sisters: not many were wise by flesh, not many mighty, not many noble" (1 Corinthians 1:26 TT). When God chooses, Calvin says, "it will follow that God does not look at the man, but draws from his own goodness the reason for doing him good" (III.23.10). On the giving, we agree with every word. Grace does not look at rank.
But the objection was about those who are not chosen, and III.23.11 turns to them. If all are guilty, say the objectors, let God punish all alike; if he will relieve some, let him relieve all. Calvin grants that the guilt is common and says that God in mercy succors some. Why not all? "But we reply that it is fair that by punishing he should also show himself a fair judge" (III.23.11). He compares God to a creditor who may forgive one debtor and exact the debt of another, and sums it up in a sentence that could stand for the whole chapter: "The Lord, therefore, can give grace to whom he wills, because he is merciful, and not give it to all, because he is a just judge" (III.23.11). When Paul says that God shut all up in unbelief that he might have mercy on all, Calvin adds "it must at the same time be added that he is debtor to no one" (III.23.11).
Marcion was accused of dividing God. Tertullian complained that he set a good God against a just one, as though goodness and judgment could not live in one being. Calvin keeps them in one being and divides humanity instead. Grace falls on some because God is merciful; punishment falls on the rest because it is fair, Calvin says, that by punishing he show himself a fair judge. If no one were punished, by Calvin's account, God would not be shown to be a fair judge. That is a God who has a use for the damned.
The verse about mercy on all is not in our Romans, but the one Calvin adds to qualify it is: "Or who has first given to him that it should be repaid to him again?" (Romans 11:3 TT). In our text that question follows the cry about the depth of the riches of God, and it means that no one has put God in his debt. It does not mean that he must collect from some. Calvin's creditor exacts the debt of some to declare what all deserve. Our Lord described a different lender: "Instead, love your enemies, do good, and lend without expecting anything in return. Then your reward will be great, and you will be children of God. For he is kind even to the ungrateful and the wicked" (Evangelion 3:35 TT). And he gave a different rule of judgment: "Don't condemn, so that you won't be condemned. Forgive, and you will be forgiven" (Evangelion 3:37 TT).
How the Decree Should Be Preached
The last objections are pastoral. If life and death are fixed by an eternal decree, why strive at all? Calvin grants more than he needed to: "And indeed they are not altogether lying: for there are very many swine who befoul the doctrine of predestination with these filthy blasphemies" (III.23.12). His answer is that election is to holiness, so that whoever uses it as a cloak for vice does not understand it. His text is the verse of Ephesians on being chosen to be holy and blameless, which our Laodiceans does not contain, though the thought is in our Paul, in a verse Calvin himself cites in the next section: "For God has not called us to impurity but to holiness" (1 Thessalonians 4:7 TT). As for the reprobate, he adds, they are vessels formed for dishonor whose crimes confirm the judgment already passed on them (III.23.12).
In III.23.13 he meets the charge that predestination kills exhortation. Paul preached free election and was all fire in exhorting, and wrote, "For we are his workmanship, created in Christ for good works which God prepared for us to walk in" (Laodiceans 2:10 TT). Calvin will not let the doctrine silence the preacher (III.23.13). He cites the saying about having ears, which stands in our Evangelion: "Whoever has ears, listen!" (Evangelion 4:33 TT). But he joins to it Isaiah's word about hearing without understanding, and that joining, which Luke's Gospel makes a few verses later, is not in our text. He gives the rest of the section to Augustine's own words, which conclude that "so too is predestination to be preached, so that whoever has ears to hear may boast of the grace of God in God and not in himself" (III.23.13).
The final section is the most humane in the chapter. Augustine, Calvin says, taught that "what is said truly can at the same time be said fittingly" (III.23.14), and there are things a preacher must never say. "If anyone should address the people thus, 'If you do not believe, it is because you have already been destined by God for destruction', he not only fosters sloth but also indulges wickedness" (III.23.14). To say it of the future would be worse: "If anyone should extend the statement to future time as well, saying that those who hear will not believe because they are reprobate, it will be cursing rather than teaching" (III.23.14). Augustine sends such teachers out of the Church. He still holds that no free will in man can resist God when he is pleased to save, but he ends where a pastor should end: "because we do not know who belongs to the number of the predestined and who does not, we ought to be so disposed as to wish all to be saved" (III.23.14).
Calvin is right in all of this, and we would have every preacher learn it. A doctrine must not be used to curse the people in the pews, and the preacher's desire must be for all. He is right that grace is no license and that the chosen are called to holiness.
But notice what he has conceded. The decree he defended for thirteen sections cannot be said to the face of the person it describes. It may be taught about the reprobate, but not to them. Our Lord's word works the other way. To the woman who washed his feet with her tears he said, "Your sins are forgiven." (Evangelion 4:26 TT), and from the cross he prayed for the men who put him there. And notice where the preacher's desire runs. Augustine, and Calvin with him, would have us desire that all be saved, because we do not know who is predestined. God knows, and by Calvin's account does not desire it. The preacher's heart is kinder than the decree he preaches. We think that heart belongs to the Father, and the decree to another.
The Creator and Another
Put the chapter together and Calvin's God stands before us whole. His will is the cause of all things and the rule of righteousness, and when we ask why, the answer is that he willed it. He owes no account. He created those whom he foresaw would go to destruction because he so willed. He made the wicked for the day of evil, and some are born doomed from the womb to glorify him by their destruction. He arranged the fall at his pleasure, and it carries nations and their infant children into eternal death without remedy. He gives grace to some because he is merciful, and withholds it from the rest because he is a just judge. He holds a grace that could convert the obstinate and chooses not to use it.
None of this is a caricature. Every line is Calvin's, and he wrote it knowing how it would sound. He would not hide the decree behind foreknowledge, or permission, or the freedom of Adam. He followed the one God to the end of the road and told us what he found there. And the proofs he brought, the plant to be rooted up, the vessels of wrath, the potter, the wicked made for the day of evil, came from Matthew, from the ninth chapter of Romans, and from Israel's Proverbs and prophets. He found the decree where the Creator speaks of himself.
We agree with Calvin about the decree. It is dreadful. We part from him over whose it is. The God who made this world, gave the Law, hardened Pharaoh and shaped the potter's clay is the God Calvin served with more consistency than anyone before him. The Father of the Evangelion was not known in Eden or at Sinai. "No one knows the Father except the Son, and no one knows the Son except the Father, and anyone to whom the Son reveals him" (Evangelion 6:30 TT). He did not arrange the fall, and he is not glorified by the destruction of anyone. He sent his Son to seek what was lost, and heaven rejoices when it is found. He "is kind even to the ungrateful and the wicked" (Evangelion 3:35 TT), and he asks his children to be like him: "Be compassionate, just as your Father has shown you compassion" (Evangelion 3:36 TT).
Calvin ended his chapter with a pastor's wish, in Augustine's words, that all might be saved. In the next chapter, on calling and hardening, he will tell us why that wish is not God's. We will follow him there, and keep listening for the Father he never met.
